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The analysis of the keys to competitiveness in the tourismsector has anunquestionable justiﬁcation for its
importance in the Spanish economy and its global growth prospects. The need for a better understanding
of the keys to the competitiveness of the tourism ﬁrm is also fuelled by the magnitude of the challenges
that it faces and by the sector structure, characterised by a notable weight of family-owned businesses.
The objective of this research lies precisely in developing a diagnosis of the return on capital of the
tourism sector and the determinants of its evolution in the family business (FB) vs non-family business20
eywords:
conomic proﬁtability
inancial proﬁtability
amily business
ourism sector
(NFB). Speciﬁcally, this study focuses on the analysis of both ﬁrm’s economic and ﬁnancial proﬁtability.
The objective indicators of the results can come either from the company itself or from two secondary
sources: SABI (Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System) and INFORMA D&B. The economic and ﬁnancial
analysis of the Spanish tourism ﬁrm with objective data developed in this study is based on a sample of
738 ﬁrms (from an initial sample of 1019 organisations).
© 2016 AEDEM. Published by Elsevier Espan˜a, S.L.U. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).ntroduction
Ample justiﬁcation for ananalysis of thekeys to competitiveness
n the tourism sector can be found in its importance to the Span-
sh economy (Vacas & Landeta, 2009; Vera & Marchena, 1996) and
ts prospects for growth at world level (Lee & Brahmasrene, 2013;
u & Lin, 2014). The need for better knowledge of the keys to the
ompetitiveness of tourism businesses is all the greater because
f the size of the challenges they face and the structure of the
ector, combining the presence of chains with a considerable inter-
ational proﬁle (Mariz-Pérez & García-Álvarez, 2009; Rufín, 2006)
ith a fragmented segment of supply dominated by small estab-
ishments (Hernández-Maestro,Mun˜oz-Gallego,&Santos-Requejo,
009) with a great deal of expertise in their activity but manage-
ent falling short of the parameters of professionalisation and best
ractice. Family-owned businesses are clearly predominant in both
egments of supply.
Family tourism businesses have often passively watched
ncreasing competition and failed to meet new challenges aris-
ng from the emergent competition, technological change and the
emodelling of demand (Aramberri, 2009), making few strategic
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: puiga@uji.es (A. Puig-Denia).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.redeen.2016.04.002
444-8451/© 2016 AEDEM. Published by Elsevier Espan˜a, S.L.U. This is an open access ar
d/4.0/).movements to respond to the process of change. Stagnation and
the absence of a well-deﬁned strategic approach could, then, con-
siderably damage the future prospects of Spanish family tourism
businesses, putting them in an inferior position to competitors in
the formof chains and other organisationswith a corporate owner-
ship structure.
The diagnosis of the performance of Spanish tourism businesses
and the factors determining their progress are also vital for helping
private agents to develop strategies generating economies of scale,
sufﬁcient synergies and the differentiation capacity to put their
competitive position on a level with the competition. However,
despite the importance of family businesses in tourism in Spain,
research in this area has been carried out only incidentally (Getz &
Carlsen, 2005).
The aim of this research lies precisely in determining the com-
petitiveness of the tourism sector based on an analysis of its
economic-ﬁnancial results, comparing family businesses (FB) with
non-family businesses (NFB). We consider that a family business
is a ﬁrm where a family exerts power over the organisation and
its strategic direction through ownership, management, or board
positions (Pieper, Klein, & Jaskiewicz, 2008).This study represents a considerable advance on the existing
literature because of the lack and controversial nature of empirical
studies of the growth and business proﬁtability of FB (Astrachan,
2010; Benavides Velasco, Guzmán Parra, & Quintana García, 2011;
ticle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
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arcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2014), and most speciﬁcally tourism FB
Andersson, Carlsen, & Getz, 2002), despite their importance over
he past decade.
Two streams of research can be identiﬁed in the family busi-
ess literature. One stream compares and contrasts family and
on-family ﬁrms in terms of performance implications. Along
hese lines, prior empirical research has found positive (e.g.
llouche, Amann, Jaussaud, & Kurashina, 2008; Block, Jaskiewicz,
Miller, 2011; Chu, 2009; Lindow, Stubner, & Wulf, 2010;
iralles-Marcelo, Miralles-Quirós, & Lisboa, 2014; Wagner, Block,
iller, Schwens, & Xi, 2015), negative (Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008;
acristán-Navarro,Gómez-Ansón,&Cabeza-García, 2011), insignif-
cant (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004;Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester,
Cannella, 2007; Westhead & Howorth, 2006) and even quadratic
De Massis, Kotlar, Campopiano, & Cassia, 2013; Kowalewski,
alavera, & Stetsyuk, 2010; Poutziouris, Savva, & Hadjielias, 2015)
elationships between family involvement in business and ﬁrm
erformance. Another stream of research investigates how the
peciﬁc characteristics of family business affect ﬁrm performance,
specially those related to ownership, governance structure, man-
gement and succession (Block et al., 2011; De Massis et al., 2013;
arcia-Castro and Aguilera, 2014; Mazzi, 2011; Miralles-Marcelo
t al., 2014; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). The results are also highly
nconsistent (see e.g. Garcia-Castro and Aguilera, 2014; Mazzi,
011; Poutziouris et al., 2015; Sacristán-Navarro et al., 2011). To
his inconsistency in the literature is added the scarcity of empirical
tudies of FB in the tourism sector (Getz & Carlsen, 2005).
These contradictory results can be explained by a number of
nterplaying factors, including the differences in the deﬁnition of
amily ﬁrms, sampling techniques, deﬁnition of variables, method-
logies, study periods and institutional settings considered by
esearchers (Miller et al., 2007; Sacristán-Navarro et al., 2011;
agner et al., 2015). To these factors are added the difﬁculties
n collecting data on this group from secondary public sources
Benavides Velasco et al., 2011).
The interest in this research is notmerely descriptive, given that
he idea is to make use of the knowledge extracted to improve the
nderstanding of the strategic tools deployed by FB and to suggest
ines of action which both tourism authorities and Spanish fam-
ly tourism businesses themselves might develop to improve their
edium- and long-term performance.
The desire for better knowledge of FB based on the theoret-
cal framework offered by strategic management, following the
ioneering call of Sharma, Chrisman, and Chua (1997), and later
idely reafﬁrmed (e.g. Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Chrisman,
teier, & Chua, 2008) is the starting point inspiring the research on
he competitiveness of FB in a good part of the current literature
onstituting the initial theoretical framework.
This study focuses, then, on the expost dimension of competi-
iveness involving the development of a sustainable competitive
dvantage that maintains or improves participation in the market
t the same time as achieving better ﬁnancial results (Camisón,
014). Speciﬁcally, this study focuses on analysing the economic
nd ﬁnancial proﬁtability of the company.
The objective indicators of results used can comeeither from the
ompany itself or from two secondary sources: the SABI (Iberian
alance Sheet Analysis System) and INFORMA D&B. The analysis
f the indicators from the primary study involved working with a
ample of 1019 businesses, which was reduced to 738 businesses
hen the objective data from the secondary sources indicated was
sed.
The proﬁtability study is carried out based on a comparative
nalysis of the average FB and NFB, both weighted by relative size.
his comparative analysis is implemented at different times to ﬁnd
uthowthebusinesses representeddevelopover time. For thispur-
ose, the years 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2008 have been chosent and Business Economics 25 (2016) 91–110
as cut-off points. This longitudinal analysis will provide an ini-
tial approach to the sensitivity of the economic-ﬁnancial situation
and the proﬁt and loss accounts of Spanish family and non-family
tourism businesses to changes in the economic cycle.
A second analysis of the economic-ﬁnancial indicators is drawn
up based on individual data from FB and NFB from the sample
intended to reveal the statistically signiﬁcant differences in the
selected variables between the two groups. The differences in
economic-ﬁnancial return between the two types of ﬁrms will be
analysed. The expost analysis of competitiveness is completed in
this way with indicators based on self-assessment by management
in relation to competitiveness, captured through the same primary
study.
Importance and singularity of family businesses
The FB model plays an important role in most capitalist
economies due to its contribution to the creation of jobs andwealth
(Bhattacharya & Ravikumar, 2001; Carrigan & Buckley, 2008). The
leading role played by FB in the economyhas led to a growing inter-
est in researching them. Along these lines, a considerable volume
of studies have analysed their impact on economic performance
(e.g. Garcia-Castro and Aguilera, 2014; Mazzi, 2011; Poutziouris
et al., 2015; Sacristán-Navarro et al., 2011). However, the empir-
ical evidence on the better performance and competitiveness of FB
compared to NFB is controversial.
A ﬁrst line of research focuses on examining the inﬂuence of
family ownership and/or management on performance. Despite
the growing literature in this respect, the results on its impact
are confused. On one hand, some studies have reported a pos-
itive relationship between family involvement and performance
(e.g. Allouche et al., 2008; Block et al., 2011; Chu, 2009; Lindow
et al., 2010; Miralles-Marcelo et al., 2014; Wagner et al., 2015).
Alloucheet al. (2008), basedonasampleof1271 listedcompanies in
Japan, demonstrate that family ﬁrms outperform non-family ﬁrms
in terms of ﬁnancial indicators (Return On Assets – ROA, Return On
Equity – ROE, Return On Invested Capital, ROIC). Chu (2009) found
that the inﬂuence of family ownership on performance (measured
with ROA and Tobin’s q) is positive for SMEs in Taiwan. Lindow
et al.’s (2010) study based on a sample of 171 German family
ﬁrms also shows that family ﬁrms play an important role in the
achievement of strategic ﬁt and, in turn, superior ﬁnancial perfor-
mance (measuredwith theROE,ROAandsubjectivemeasurement).
Although it is a weak effect, Wagner et al. (2015) also found that
family ﬁrms show superior ﬁnancial performance compared to
non-family ﬁrms, on the basis of a meta-analysis. These authors
also ﬁnd size and conceptual deﬁnitions as important moderators
of the relationship. The importance of controlling the deﬁnition of
family ﬁrm and the nature of the sample is also pointed out in the
studybyMiller et al. (2007). Blocket al. (2011), usingapanel dataset
of 419ﬁrms, state that family and founderownership are associated
with superior performance (measured by Tobin’s q). However, they
did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant support for the effect of family and founder
management on performance.Miralles-Marcelo et al. (2014), using
a panel dataset of Spanish and Portuguese ﬁrms, show that family
control has a positive impact on ﬁrmperformance (measured using
Tobin’sQandROA),which ispositivelymoderatedbyﬁrm’s size and
age.
Some studies have also demonstrated a negative relationship
between family involvement and ﬁnancial performance. Cucculelli
and Micucci (2008), using a sample of 3548 Italian manufacturing
ﬁrms, ﬁnd that keeping management in the family has a negative
impact on the ﬁrm’s performance (ROA and ROS). Sacristán-
Navarro et al. (2011), using a panel of 118 non-ﬁnancial Spanish
companies, show that family management hampers proﬁtability
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measured as a proxy of ﬁrmperformance deﬁned as the proﬁtabil-
ty ratio ROA). However, these authors did not ﬁnd any inﬂuence of
amily ownership on performance.
To these two types of effect are added other studies that found
o statistically signiﬁcant associations between family ownership
nd performance in terms of sales growth (Schulze, Lubatkin,
Dino, 2003); short-term sales growth (Chrisman et al., 2004),
onsidering several performance indicators as growth sales rev-
nues, number of people employed, ﬁrm’s exported sales, total
ross sales exported, proﬁtability, and a subjective measure of
verage performance (Westhead & Howorth, 2006), and in terms
f sales, sales growth and Tobin’s q (Miller et al., 2007). Sciascia
nd Mazzola (2008) ran regression analyses on data drawn from
20 privately owned family ﬁrms in Italy ﬁnding no association
etween family ownership and performance, captured through a
elf-reported measure taking into account the ﬁrms’ sales growth,
evenue growth, net proﬁt growth, return on net asset growth,
eduction of debt/equity ratio, return on equity growth, and divi-
end growth. Instead, these authors found that family involvement
nmanagement has a negative quadratic (invertedU-shaped) effect
n performance. This effect points out that performance decreases
s family involvement increases and that the decrease is greater
t higher levels of involvement. Kowalewski et al. (2010), using
panel data of 217 public companies, also found an inverted U-
haped relationship between the proportion of family ownership
nd ﬁnancial performance (measured with the ROE and ROA). De
assis et al. (2013) also conﬁrm these results by conducting an
mpirical analysis on 494 small-to-medium size private family
rms in Italy. Speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd support for the existence of
U-shaped relationship between the degree of family ownership
ispersion and ﬁrm performance, measured as ROA. Using a panel
ataset ofUK companies listed on the LondonStock Exchange (LSE),
outziouris et al. (2015) also demonstrate an inverted U-shaped
elationship between family ownership and ﬁrm performance
measured with accounting ratios and Tobin’s q). Speciﬁcally, their
esults show that performance increases until family shareholding
eaches thirty-one percent.
The lack of homogeneity in the result of previous studies sug-
ests that the relationships between family business and corporate
erformance are complex and even moderated or mediated by
actors not included in previous analysis. In this vein, some of
hese studies highlight positive aspects of family ﬁrms within the
tewardship and agency perspectives, whereas others emphasise
egative ones.
The positive aspects include the culture transmitted in the
rganisation, the reputation of the business based on the track
ecord of the family over generations, long-term orientation or
reater trust between members and stakeholders (Audretsch,
ülsbeck, & Lehmann, 2013; Gallo & Amat, 2003; Miller & Le
reton-Miller, 2005; Whiteside, Aronoff, & Ward, 1993).
On the other hand, the potential negative effects of fam-
ly inﬂuence refer to altruism and family nepotism (Bloom &
an Reenen, 2007; Pérez-González, 2006; Schulze et al., 2003),
ntrenchment (Gomez-Mejia, Nun˜ez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001),
ree-riding (Schulze et al., 2003), the consumption of unearned
erks (Chrisman et al., 2004) and expropriation of minority share-
olders (e.g., Miller et al., 2007), that can lead to agency problems
hat damage performance. Equally, some studies highlight certain
ehaviour and characteristics of FB which would be incompati-
le with entrepreneurial orientation. These might include more
onservative behaviour, lack of differentiation, low levels of inno-
ation and a high level of risk aversion (Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjöberg,
Wiklund, 2007; Ward, 1986; Zahra, 2005). Although FB initially
how entrepreneurial behaviour (Nordqvist, Habbershon, & Melin,
009), maintaining this entrepreneurial orientation is a real chal-
enge as time goes on (Casillas, Moreno, & Barbero, 2010; Cruz &t and Business Economics 25 (2016) 91–110 93
Nordqvist, 2012; Kellermanns, Eddleston, Barnett, & Pearson, 2008;
Naldi et al., 2007). There are also studies that indicate that FB have
serious problems that lead to their average life expectancy being
cut short (Craig & Moores, 2006; Neubauer & Lank, 1998, p. 44),
ﬁnding it difﬁcult to achieve a third generation of family control.
In order to shed light on these conﬂicting ﬁndings, and consid-
ering that differences in performance among family ﬁrms are even
higher than those between family and non-family business (Chua,
Chrisman, Steier, & Rau, 2012), another strand of the literature
focuses on analysing which of the speciﬁc explanatory variables
deﬁnedby the structureof ownership andcontrol andmanagement
of FB, and internal and external moderating variables, inﬂuence
economic performance. This body of research ﬁts in with the main
foundations of the Resource Based View (RBV), that deﬁne the spe-
ciﬁc resources and capacities of FB deriving from family-business
interaction as a result of the involvement in the business of the
owner family – its capital, governance structure and manage-
ment system. This involves the interaction of systems between the
family as a whole, the people who make it up and the business
(Habbershon & Williams, 1999).
On the basis of RBV, agency theory and stewardship theory
studies like those by Anderson and Reeb (2003), Westhead and
Howorth (2006) and Maury (2006) ﬁnd that family involvement is
an effective form of control, providing incentive structures result-
ing in fewer agency conﬂicts, and costs, leading to better ﬁnancial
and market value performance by family businesses. Speciﬁcally,
Anderson and Reeb (2003), using the Standard & Poors 500 ﬁrms,
show that when a family member serves as CEO, performance
(measured with ROA and Tobin’s q) is better than with an outside
CEO. Westhead and Howorth (2006), analysing data from privately
held family ﬁrms in the United Kingdom, show that ﬁrms with
high levels of family ownership and management were not signiﬁ-
cantly associated with superior performance indicators. However,
their research provides evidence that the family ﬁrms with larger
teams of directors and managers have greater levels of growth in
sales and revenues. Maury (2006), analysing a sample of 1672 non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms in Western Europe, also found that active family
control increases proﬁtability (measured with ROA and Tobin’s q)
compared to non-family ﬁrms. Lee (2006), based on a sample of
403 ﬁrms, conﬁrms that family businesses tend to obtain higher
employment and revenue growth when founding family members
are involved in management. The ﬁndings obtained by Barontini
and Caprio (2006) and Sraer and Thesmar (2007) are also consis-
tent with these results, highlighting the beneﬁts of the family’s
involvement in management.
Other studies, like that by Barth, Gulbrandsen, and Schøne
(2005), analysing 438 Norwegian ﬁrms, have found that family-
owned and managed ﬁrms are less productive in terms of added
value than non-family ﬁrms. However, they show that family-
owned ﬁrms managed by a person hired from outside the owner
family are just as productive as non-family-owned ﬁrms, not
ﬁnding support for the hypothesis that concentrated ownership
necessarily affects productivity. This study points out that pro-
fessional managers hired in the market are more efﬁcient in
operating the ﬁrm. On the basis of a panel data from 180 of pub-
licly traded Chilean ﬁrms from 2000 and 2003, Silva and Majluf
(2008) show that family ownership does have an impact on perfor-
mance, which may be positive or negative depending on voting
rights concentration. At higher concentration, family ownership
subtracts value from the ﬁrm and their contribution is more neg-
ative when they become highly involved in management. The
opposite is true when concentration is low. Villalonga and Amit
(2006), using proxy data on all Fortune-500 ﬁrms, demonstrate
that the presence of descendants as CEOs has a negative impact on
performance (using Tobin’s q) and conﬂicts with minority share-
holders.
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Meanwhile, O’Boyle Jr, Pollack, and Rutherford (2012), using a
eta-analysis, ﬁnd that there is no direct, signiﬁcant relationship
etween family involvement and a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial performance.
nstead, they analyse the effects of potential moderators. The con-
eptual moderators they include are: public vs private, ﬁrm size
nd cultural context. They also include the following methodologi-
almoderators: family involvement, ﬁrmperformance, publication
nd publication quality, and year of publication. Their analysis of
otential moderators provided no evidence that these modera-
ors were statistically or practically signiﬁcant. Garcia-Castro and
guilera (2014) use data from the OSIRIS database to carry out
ethods from set theory. Their results also conﬁrm that the effects
f family involvement in business (measured as industry-adjusted
OE) are not direct but rather subject to substantial complemen-
arity and substitution effects among the components of family
nvolvement related to governance (family board and family chair-
an), ownership (family ownership), management (family CEO)
nd succession (succession). Craig, Dibrell, and Garrett (2014),
sing a sample of 359 ﬁrms, found evidence that the family effect
n performance (measured through sales growth, market share
rowth and return on sales) is mediated by culture, strategic ﬂexi-
ility and innovativeness.
Finally, there are studies proﬁling non-linear relationships
etween the features of governance and the corporate struc-
ure of the business and its ﬁnancial results. Speciﬁcally, Naldi,
hirico, Kellermanns, and Campopiano (2015), using a sample
f 128 Swedish family ﬁrms, predict an inverted U-shaped rela-
ionship between the number of family advisors and family ﬁrm
erformance (measured through ROA). They also found that the
eneration which controls the ﬁrm moderates this effect so that
amily advisors have a positive relationship with performance in
rst-generation familyﬁrmsandan invertedU-shaped relationship
ith performance in later-generation family ﬁrms.
It is therefore appropriate to wonder whether the FB model is
guarantee of competitiveness and growth in the modern tourism
ector, characterised by a high level of competition, internation-
lisation and the development of new commercial, technological,
uman, organisational and management requirements.
Table 1 presents a summary of the empirical studies analysed.
he table gathers, on the one hand, the papers related to the differ-
nces in performance between FB and NFB and, on the other hand,
hepapers that analyse the speciﬁc characteristics of FB affecting its
erformance. This second block of papers posits that there may be
mportant differences among FB due to the speciﬁc characteristics
f each FB, regarding their ownership and governance structure,
amily involvement in management and control-enhancing mech-
nisms. Some of these studies also point out some internal and
xternal moderating variables that inﬂuence economic perfor-
ance of FB.
he characteristics of family businesses in the tourism
ector
Although there are few studies dealing with the analysis of FB
n the area of tourism (Andersson et al., 2002; Getz & Carlsen,
005), investigating it in this context is particularly relevant, and
ossibly even more so in the case of Spain. The Spanish tourism
ector has traditionally been dominated by this type of business.
espite the fact that the growth experienced by this sector has led
o the appearance of businesses and chains without family links,
amily-owned individual establishments and chains continue to be
ery important, and they are a key element in all segments of the
panish tourism market. This fact contrasts with the situation at
nternational level, where the big corporate chains are becoming
ncreasingly important.t and Business Economics 25 (2016) 91–110
The tourism sector offers great opportunities for FB; for
example, the fact that a tourism FB incorporates host-guest inter-
action can generate unique customer experiences and satisfaction
(Andersson et al., 2002; Getz & Carlsen, 2005). In this way, fam-
ilies can form part of the tourism experience (Wanhill, 1997,
2000), increasing the value of this service. Equally, the connection
between tourism activity and free time, speciﬁc lifestyles or the
fact that a location is desirable for a person can lead to a family
establishing a tourism business (Ateljevic & Doorne, 2000; Getz &
Carlsen, 2000).
Despite the considerable importance of FB in the tourism sec-
tor, the literature on the topic is scarce if compared with studies
in other industries (Getz & Carlsen, 2000; Chrisman et al., 2008). It
must also be recognised that the bulk of this literature on tourism
FB is not exclusively based on research into issues related to family
businesses as such, but rather as a secondary element associated
with small businesses (Getz, Carlsen, & Morrison, 2004). This small
size of tourism FB is noted as one of the factors explaining the lack
of studies related to economic performance and business growth.
In addition, empirical research on tourism FB seems to focus
on analysing the business owners’ characteristics and attitudes
(Andersson et al., 2002; Getz & Carlsen, 2000; Getz & Peterson,
2005), managerial strategies (Craig & Lindsay, 2002), and other
non-economic objectives of the owners more related to lifestyle,
socioeconomicwealth and diversiﬁcation in other businesses (Getz
& Carlsen, 2000; Getz & Peterson, 2005) as well as location and
legacy goals (Andersson et al., 2002).
According to Getz et al. (2004) these differences between
research on the tourism sector and other economic sectors is
explained above all by the lack of entry barriers preventing new
entrepreneurs and business peoplewith little business preparation
or training investing in the tourism sector (Getz et al., 2004). The
small size of certain tourism businesses (cafes, bars, restaurants,
etc.) implies low levels of capital and operating costs and the pos-
sibility of them being run by few people, which can encourage the
creation of an FB (Getz & Carlsen, 2000). We can therefore consider
that in tourism FB the business is more focused on the family than
on economic objectives.
The concept of family businesses
It is difﬁcult to deﬁne the term FB because, rather than a
universally adopted deﬁnition, a wide variety of concepts and
measurements have emerged in this respect (Miller et al., 2007).
Sometimes, this conceptual disparity may be the result of the
researcher’s aims while on other occasions it may be caused by the
restrictions of the empirical source used (e.g. Galve & Salas, 2003).
Some authors have tried to determine common characteristics
of the different deﬁnitions of FB. Along these lines, Handler (1989)
identiﬁed three dimensions: a family share in the ownership, the
considerationof the family and thebusiness as interdependent sub-
systems, and the family group’s desire for continuity taking the
form of generational transfer. Based on these three dimensions,
Shanker and Astrachan (1996) proposed classifying FB in three
levels representing increasing family involvement in the organi-
sation. In this way, FB could be deﬁned with a broad, intermediate
or restrictive concept:
- Broad concept: considering only the “ownership structure”
dimension. In this case, a business with the founder or his/her
descendants holding majority ownership and controlling strate-
gic decisions is understood to be an FB. This concept requires
part of the share capital to be family capital and, in addition, a
majority of the capital with voting rights must be in the hands of
C. Camisón et al. / European Journal of Management and Business Economics 25 (2016) 91–110 95
Table 1
Summary of the analysed empirical studies.
Reference Location Theoretical
roots
Main variables and results
BLOCK 1. Inﬂuence of family ownership and/or management on performance (differences between family and non-family ﬁrms)
Allouche et al.
(2008)
Japan Agency theory Dependent variables:
- Firm performance: items related to proﬁtability indicators and ﬁnancial
structures
Independent variables:
- Nature of the business: family or non-family (s., family)
- Degree of family control (n.s.)
Positive effects
Chu (2009) Taiwan Stewardship
and agency
theories
Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: ROA and Tobin’s q
Independent variables:
- Family ownership
Moderating variables:
- Firm size
- Family management
- Family control (chairman)
Lindow et al.
(2010)
German Contingency
theory and
family systems
theory
Dependent variable:
- ROE, ROA and subjective measurement
Independent variable:
- Family inﬂuence
- Strategy (mediating variable)
- Organisational structure (mediating variable)
- Strategic ﬁt (mediating variable)
Moderating variables:
- Family inﬂuence
Block et al.
(2011)
United
States
Agency theory Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: Tobin’s q
Independent variables:
- Ownership: ownership by founder vs ownership by family
- Management: management by founder vs management by family
Miralles-
Marcelo et al.
(2014)
Spain and
Portugal
Behavioural
and agency
theories
Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: ﬁnancial performance (Tobin’s q and ROA) and stock
market performance
Independent variables:
- Family vs non-family ﬁrms
Moderating variables:
- Type of family ﬁrm: CEO is the founder/other family member vs otherwise
- Age and size of the ﬁrm
Wagner et al.
(2015)
Several
countries
(41)
Agency theory Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: ROA, ROE, ROS, sales growth and market-to-book value
Moderating variables:
- Family classiﬁcation: Family ownership, family management, a combined
measure of the two, and self-reported family business
- Conceptual moderators: a ﬁrms’ listing on the stock market, ﬁrm size, and
cultural dimensions
- Study-speciﬁc moderators: publication status, year of publication, and
journal quality
Cucculelli and
Micucci
(2008)
Italy Agency theory
and succession
literature
Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: ROA and ROS
Independent variable:
- After succession vs before succession
Moderating variables:
- Heir-managed vs unrelated-managed
- Good performers vs poor performers
- Strong competition sector
- Medium-high tech sector vs medium-low or low tech sector
Negative effects
Sacristán-
Navarro et al.
(2011)
Spain Stewardship
and agency
theories
Dependent variable:
- Proﬁtability: proxy of ﬁrm performance deﬁned as the proﬁtability ratio ROA)
Independent variables:
- Firm ownership
- Family ownership
- Family control
- Family CEO
- Family Chairman
Schulze et al.
(2003)
United
States
Agency theory
and household
economics and
altruism
literatures
Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: sales growth
Independent variables:
- Family pay incentives
- Non-family pay incentives
- Firms that pay dividends
Moderating variables:
- Firms that will be “sold to outside investors” vs “transfer to family”
- Firms where the share transfer intentions remain unknown vs ﬁrms where
the share transfer intentions are known
- Firms whose CEO intends to retire within the next 5 years vs whose CEOs
have no such intention
No statistically
signiﬁcant effects
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Table 1 (Continued)
Reference Location Theoretical
roots
Main variables and results
Chrisman et al.
(2004)
United
States
Agency theory Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: short-term sales growth
Independent variable:
- Family business
Moderating variables:
- Agency cost control mechanisms: strategic planning and board
Westhead and
Howorth
(2006)
United
Kingdom
Stewardship
and agency
theories
Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: growth sales revenues, number of people employed,
ﬁrm’s export sales, total gross sales exported, proﬁtability, and a subjective
measure of average performance
Independent variables:
- Ownership structure
- Management structure
- Company objectives
Miller et al.
(2007)
United
States
Stewardship
and agency
theories
Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: sales, sales growth, and Tobin’s q
Independent variables:
- Family ﬁrm
- Family generation
- Lone founder’s involvement
- Family or lone founder ﬁrm
- Family or lone founder is the largest shareholder in the ﬁrm
- Family or lone founder is the largest shareholder in the ﬁrm and also serves
as the ﬁrm’s CEO
- Shares owned (%)
- A family member or the lone founder is the CEO
- A family member or the lone founder is the chairman
- A family member or the lone founder is the CEO and the chairman
Sciascia and
Mazzola
(2008)
Italy Stewardship
and agency
theories
Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: self-reported measure taking into account the ﬁrm’s sales
growth, revenue growth, net proﬁt growth, return on net asset growth,
reduction of debt/equity ratio, return on equity growth, and dividend growth
Independent variables:
- Family involvement in ownership (FIO)
- Family involvement in management (FIM)
Moderation variable:
- Interaction effects between FIO and FIM
Quadratic
relationships
Kowalewski
et al. (2010)
Poland Agency theory
and RBV
Dependent variable:
- Financial performance (ROE and ROA)
Independent variables:
- Family ownership
- Family share (%)
- Family voting rights (%)
- Family CEO
- Family chairman
- Family owned companies cutoffs
- Outside investors
De Massis et al.
(2013)
Italy Agency theory Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: ROA
Independent variable:
- Family ownership
- Family ownership dispersion
Moderating variables:
- Family ratio in the TMT
Poutziouris
et al. (2015)
United
Kingdom
Agency and
stewardship
theories
Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: accounting ratios and Tobin’s q
Inependent variables:
- Family ﬁrm
- Young/old family
- Family board representation
- Founder as the controlling shareholder
- Duality (CEO is also the Chairman)
- Family executive (CEO)
- Family/non-family succession
- Family ownership (%)
Moderating variables:
- The role of a family CEO at the helm, family board representation
- The role of duality where the family CEO is also the Chairperson
Block 2. Speciﬁc characteristics of family business affecting its performance
Anderson and
Reeb (2003)
United
States
Agency theory
and economic
approach
Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: ROA and Tobin’s q
Independent variables:
- Family ﬁrm
- Family ownership
- CEO: founders, founder descendants or hired (outsiders)
Positive effects
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Table 1 (Continued)
Reference Location Theoretical
roots
Main variables and results
Westhead and
Howorth
(2006)
United
Kingdom
Stewardship
and agency
theories
(See ﬁrst block of the table)
Maury (2006) Western
Europe
Agency theory Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: ROA and Tobin’s q
Independent variables:
- The largest controlling shareholder holding at least 10% of the voting rights is
a family, an individual, or an unlisted ﬁrm
- The family controlling shareholder is an unlisted ﬁrm
- The largest controlling shareholder is an identiﬁed family or individual
- The controlling shareholder is a family or an individual who holds the CEO,
Honorary Chairman, Chairman, or Vice Chairman position
- Widely held dummy
- Ownership (measures the proportion of cash-ﬂow rights held by the largest
shareholder)
- Control minus ownership (difference between the control rights and the
cash-ﬂow rights held by the largest shareholder)
- Multiple blockholders
- Antidirector rights
Lee (2006) United
States
Agency theory Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: employment, revenue growth, gross income (before
taxes) growth, and net proﬁt margin
Independent variables:
- Family ownership
- Family management
Barontini and
Caprio
(2006)
Continental
Europe
Agency theory Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: Tobin’s q and ROA
Independent variables:
- Family ﬁrm
- Ownership concentration
- Family control
Moderating variables
- Family CEO vs Family non-executive-directors
- Founders vs descendants
Sraer and
Thesmar
(2007)
France Economic
approach
Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: ROA, ROE, market to book, dividend to proﬁt
Independent variables:
- Family ﬁrm
- Founder-controlled
- Heir-controlled
- Professionally managed
Audretsch et al.
(2013)
German Agency theory Dependent variable:
- Financial performance: proﬁt per employee and return on investment
Independent variables:
- Family monitoring
- Family ownership
- Family management
Barth et al.
(2005)
Norway Agency theory Dependent variable:
- Productivity: added value
Independent variables:
- Family ﬁrm
- Family ownership
- Family management
Negative effects
Silva and
Majluf
(2008)
Chile Agency theory
and
institutional
theory
Dependent variable:
- Performance: proxy of Tobin’s q and ROA
Independent variables:
- Family afﬁliation
- Family involvement
- Firm external linkages
Moderating variables:
- Ownership concentration
Villalonga and
Amit (2006)
United
States
Agency theory Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: Tobin’s q
Independent variables:
- Family ﬁrm
- Family ownership
- Family ownership stake
- Control-enhancing mechanisms
- Family excess vote holdings
- Presence of a family CEO
Schulze et al.
(2003)
United
States
Agency theory
and household
economics and
altruism
literatures
(See ﬁrst block of the table)
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Table 1 (Continued)
Reference Location Theoretical
roots
Main variables and results
Pérez-González
(2006)
United
States
Agency theory Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: operating return on assets, net income to assets, and
market-to-book ratios
Independent variables:
- Management: family successions vs unrelated successions
Moderating variables:
- CEO Selective college vs
- CEO less selective college
Bloom and Van
Reenen
(2007)
United
States,
France,
Germany
and the
United
Kingdom
Agency theory Dependent variable:
- Firms’ management scores
Independent variables:
- Family largest shareholder
- Family largest shareholder and family CEO
- Family largest shareholder, family CEO, and primogeniture
Gomez-Mejia
et al. (2001)
Spain Agency theory Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: volume of circulation (performance trend and
performance changes)
- Business risk
- Length of survival
Independent variable:
- Family status
- Relational agency contract
- Executive tenure
- CEO succession
Moderating variables
- Executive Level: CEO’s vs Editors
Chrisman et al.
(2004)
United
States
Agency theory (See ﬁrst block of the table)
Miller et al.
(2007)
United
States
Agency and
stewardship
theories
(See ﬁrst block of the table)
Zahra (2005) United
States
Agency theory Dependent variable:
- Entrepreneurial risk taking: use of domestic alliances, use of alliances in
foreign markets, entering new domestic markets, entering new foreign
markets, Investment in emerging radical technologies, fadical product
innovation and introduction
Independent variables:
- CEO is also the founder
- CEO tenure
- Family ownership
- Number of family generations
Naldi et al.
(2007)
Sweden Agency theory
and
entrepreneur-
ship
Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: self-assessment
Independent variables:
- Entrepreneurial orientation
- Innovativeness
- Proactiveness
- Risk taking
Kellermanns
et al. (2008)
United
States
Entrepreneurship Dependent variable
- Employment growth: measured via a subjective self-reported assessment
Independent variables:
- Entrepreneurial behaviour (mediating variable)
- Tenure
- Age
- Number of generations currently working in the family ﬁrm.
Casillas et al.
(2010)
Spain Conﬁgurational
approach and
RBV
Dependent variable
- Firm growth: percentage of growth in sales over a 4-year period
Independent variables:
- Entrepreneurial orientation
Moderating variables:
- Environment (dynamic and hostile)
- Generational involvement
Cruz and
Nordqvist
(2012)
Spain Agency theory
and
entrepreneur-
ship
Dependent variable:
- Entrepreneurial orientation: Proactiveness, Risk taking and Innovativeness
Independent variables:
- Environment dynamism
- Technological opportunities
- Industry Growth
- Non-family managers
- Non-family investors
Moderating variables:
- Generation in Control of the Family Firm
C. Camisón et al. / European Journal of Management and Business Economics 25 (2016) 91–110 99
Table 1 (Continued)
Reference Location Theoretical
roots
Main variables and results
Craig and
Moores
(2006)
Australia Contingency
theory
Dependent variable:
- Innovation
Independent variables:
- Perceived environmental uncertainty
- Technoeconomic uncertainty
- Competition and constraints
- Scope of information
- Timeliness of information
- Centralization
- Formalisation
- Age
O’Boyle et al.
(2012)
Several
countries
Agency theory Dependent variable:
- Firm performance
Independent variable:
- Family involvement
Moderating variables:
- Conceptual moderators: public vs private, ﬁrm size and cultural context
- Methodological moderators: family involvement, ﬁrm performance,
publication and publication quality and year of publication
Other effects
Garcia-Castro
and Aguilera
(2014)
Several
countries
Contingency
theory
Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: ROE
Independent variables:
- Family ownership
- Family board
- Family Chairman
- Family CEO
- Succession
Craig et al.
(2014)
United
States
RBV Dependent variable:
- Firm performance: sales growth, market share growth and return on sales
Independent variables:
- Family inﬂuence
- Family business culture (mediating variable)
- Flexible planning systems (mediating variable)
- Firm innovativeness (mediating variable)
Naldi et al.
(2015)
Sweden Agency and
stewardship
theories
Dependent variable:
- Firm performance (ROA)
Independent variables:
- Family member advisors
Moderating variables:
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the family, so the members linked by family relationships have
enough voting power to decide the organisation’s strategy.
Intermediate concept: in this case, ﬁrms simultaneously meeting
two criteria are considered as FB: ﬁrstly, theirmajority ownership
mustbe in thehandsof the family,whichmeans itsmembershave
the voting power to control strategic decisions (this requirement
also deﬁnes the broad concept of FB). Secondly, the family owners
must have a degree of direct participation in the implementation
of the strategy and the running of the business, which requires at
least one member of the family to belong to senior management.
Restrictive concept: this considers that FB must meet the two
above requirements while there must be different generations of
the family coexisting within the organisation.
The three concepts have their own advantages and disadvan-
ages, so it is difﬁcult to choose between them. For example, the
road concept – the most open one – can fail to take into account
ther characteristic features of FB, as it is limited to a single dimen-
ion. Meanwhile, the intermediate concept is more restrictive, as
t would exclude businesses that have opted to separate control of
wnership from management control. Finally, unlike the restric-
ive concept, these two concepts – broad and intermediate – allow
rst-generation FB in their deﬁnition with the idea that a desire for
ontinuity does not necessary require generational change.
The evaluation of FB has been developed based on the typo-
ogy we have mentioned, constructed by Shanker and Astrachan
1996). Speciﬁcally, the measurement of FB adopted in this studyfor exploiting the results is based on the broad concept. Given the
difﬁculty when it comes to adopting a clear criterion for concep-
tualising FB, some authors opt to leave it to the judgement of the
person answering a questionnaire to decide whether or not the
business is a family one (e.g. Dibrell & Moeller, 2011; Gallo, Tàpies,
& Cappuyns, 2004; Neubaum, Dibrell, & Craig, 2012). This crite-
rion is also used in studies on FB in tourism: speciﬁcally, Getz and
Carlsen (2000) champion this method and use it in their study
for its advantages because it is easy for the person answering
the question to understand and so as not to impose a restrictive
deﬁnition.
Despite the level of subjectivity inherent in this formof discrim-
inatingbetweenFBandNFB, it seems reasonable that anafﬁrmative
response to the question whether the business is a family one
implies that the family participates in the business either in a for-
mal or informal way, which would, in most cases, correspond to
the broad deﬁnition. This form of differentiation would include all
businesses conducting themselves and behaving as FB. Along these
lines, Chua, Chrisman, and Sharma (1999) maintain that it seems
more reasonable to use inclusive deﬁnitions than exclusive ones.
These authors believe it is quite unreasonable to use a deﬁnition
that excludes a large number of FB when the businesses them-
selves insist, or a large group of academics believe, that they are
FB. Recent studies like those by Sabah, Carsrud, and Kocak (2014),
Basco and Voordeckers (2015) or López-Delgado and Diéguez-Soto
(2015) also use broad concepts of FB, preferring less exclusive def-
initions.
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ata and descriptive analysis
ample and data
The database consists of a total of 1019 tourism businesses, of
hich 748 are FB and 271 NFB. The data is obtained using the
uestionnaire technique, a tool regularly used in studies of com-
etitiveness (Camisón, 1997, 2001), through personal interviews,
ubsequently completed with data from the SABI (Iberian Balance
heet Analysis System) and INFORMA D&B databases.
The ﬁrst questionnaire was designed in August 2009. This ﬁnal
uestionnaire was subjected to a progressive perfection process
o make it easier to understand and more effective in collecting
he desired information, as well as shorter and quicker to apply.
fter four successive versions, the design of the questionnaire was
nally completed at the end of October 2009. Meanwhile, before
eginning the application of the ﬁnal questionnaire to collect data,
ts design was pre-tested between ﬁve academics specialising in
he ﬁelds of tourism and strategy. This pre-test took place in the
rst twoweeks ofNovember 2009. The resulting questionnairewas
lso administered to eight managers from businesses of different
izes and segments in the tourism sector and their comments and
mprovement proposals were considered in the ﬁnal design of the
uestionnaire.
To avoid the risk of automatic, unconsidered answers, the order
f the answers was varied so that, in some cases, the order of desir-
bilitywas descending and in others ascending; control itemswere
ncluded where the sense of afﬁrmation was contrary to the rest of
he scale, and questions on the same topic were included in differ-
nt formats and locations to check the reliability of the response.
Concerning the interviewees, it was considered that business
wners and company chief executives or managing directors were
he ideal people to answer the questionnaire. To correct the recog-
ised problems suffered by questionnaires as a means of obtaining
ata and seeking to raise the response rate and the quality of the
nformation, a set of recommended procedures for research with
uestionnaires was used, involving a modiﬁed version of Dillman’s
total design method” (Dillman, 1978). This method has a long tra-
ition in theﬁeldof strategy (Conant,Mokwa,&Varadarajan, 1990).
he ﬁeldwork continued from December 2009 to March 2010.
The sample can be considered an acceptable reﬂection of the
panish tourism sector at an overall level. Concerning the size,
he sample design was distributed as follows: 62.71% microbusi-
esses (including 54.8% microbusinesses where there is at least
ne employee as well as the owner and another 7.9% forms of
elf-employment); 25.22% small businesses, 9.62% medium-sizes
usinesses and2.45% largebusinesses. By the typeof tourist activity
arried out, 30.03% are accommodation businesses, 37.88% catering
ompanies, 11% intermediary ﬁrms (travel agencies, tour opera-
ors, etc.), 3.93% transport organisations and 17.17% make up what
s known as the complementary offer. As for geographical location,
lthough the tourismoffer is dispersed, it is distributed asymmetri-
ally over Spanish territory, concentrated in the strongest tourism
entres. Our sample has considered the following zones around
hich the largest tourism offer is concentrated. In terms of impor-
ance, our database is divided as follows: Balearic Islands (19.63%),
anary Islands (19.33%), Andalusia (19.23%), Catalonia (16.58%),
he Valencian Community (10.30%), Madrid (8.15%) and the other
egions (6.78%).
ariables and measuresThe objective indicators of results used can come either from
hebusiness itself or from two secondary sources: The SABI (Iberian
alance Sheet Analysis System) and INFORMA D&B. As not all busi-
esses deposit their annual accounts with the Companies Registert and Business Economics 25 (2016) 91–110
and a certain number of others did not agree to provide precise data
directly, the economic-ﬁnancial analysis of Spanish tourism busi-
nesses with objective data from external sources developed in this
study refers to a sample of 738 businesses (froman initial sample of
1019 organisations). Of these 738 businesses, 73.44% are FB, while
26.56% are NFB.
The proﬁtability study is carried out based on a comparative
analysis of the average FB and NFB, both weighted by relative size.
This comparative analysis is executed at different times to ﬁnd out
how the businesses represented develop over time. For this end,
the years 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2008 have been chosen as
cut-off points.
A second analysis of the economic-ﬁnancial indicators is drawn
up based on individual data from FB and NFB from the sample
intended to reveal the statistically signiﬁcant differences in the
selected variables between the two groups. Speciﬁcally, the differ-
ences in the gross proﬁt per service unit, economic performance,
ﬁnancial performance and return on sales (see Table 3) between
both types of ﬁrm will be analysed. These indicators gathered in
Table 3 are the ones derived from the primary study using the
questionnaire technique. The expost analysis of competitiveness is
completed, in this way, with indicators based on self-assessment
by management in relation to competitiveness captured through
the same primary study. Self-assessment based on management
perception is a common procedure in strategic research. Although
this procedure is notwithout its risks, including the overestimation
by management of their action and the position of the organisa-
tion they run, so we might consider this data as an upper limit
possibly above the actual ﬁgures (De Vries, 1987; Jackall, 1988),
the literature has empirically shown the convergence of objective
and subjective measurements both on aspects of organisational
performance and concerning other internal and external business
variables.
Results
Return on capital indicators
Return on capital or investment is often the indicator used to
assess the efﬁciency of the management of a business. As a ﬁrst
approach, it can be deﬁned as the relationship (normally expressed
as a percentage) between the company’s proﬁts and the corre-
sponding investment or capital invested.
Table 2 includes the values of some of the most common indica-
tors of return on capital, applied to the empirical study. As can be
seen, the returnon capital fromFB is signiﬁcantly higher in all ratios
calculated in 1998 and 2004, while in 2001 and between 2004 and
2008, NFB outperform them in all these indices. The differences are
not related to the point in the economic cycle or the magnitude of
the ratios. Although the comparison in the two most recent years
seems to point ﬁrmly towards better economic-ﬁnancial perfor-
mance by NFB, showing greater competitiveness, the variability of
the resultsmeans it is advisable to interpret themprudently, devel-
oping a deeper analysis of their development and the factors that
determine it.
The assessment of economic-ﬁnancial performance from the
perspective of management self-assessment conﬁrms the conclu-
sions already anticipated based on the analysis of objective data.
The gross proﬁt per service unit and return on turnover, as well as
return on (economic and ﬁnancial) capital, are signiﬁcantly better
in NFB (Table 3).
Despite this variety of indicators, the two most commonly used
indices for discovering operational efﬁciency are economic return
and ﬁnancial return. The two indices are necessary because they
complement the information on different facets of the business:
while economic return reﬂects the operational efﬁciency of the
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Table 2
Development of return on capital (%) in family and non-family tourism businesses (1998–2008).
1998 2001 2004 2007 2008
FB NFB FB NFB FB NFB FB NFB FB NFB
Economic return 10.24 0.78 4.95 8.31 3.28 1.21 2.91 3.95 1.53 2.32
Financial return before tax 25.68 7.49 6.69 10.57 3.89 0.49 3.85 8.47 1.43 2.53
Financial return after tax 26.87 9.92 8.13 12.26 5.14 1.39 4.77 9.48 0.95 2.54
Return on capital used 21.21 9.27 8.11 11.75 5.13 2.60 5.87 8.54 3.55 5.19
Proﬁt margin 7.02 5.74 5.70 8.89 3.94 0.95 3.48 4.91 0.75 1.84
Source: Own compilation based on SABI and INFORMA data.
Economic return=EBIT/TA.
Financial return=ordinary proﬁt/pre-tax loss/own funds.
Financial return after tax =ordinary proﬁt/loss after tax/own funds.
Return on capital used= (Ordinary proﬁt/pre-tax loss/+ﬁnancial costs)/(own funds +ﬁxed assets).
Proﬁt margin =ordinary proﬁt/loss before tax/operating revenues.
Table 3
Economic-ﬁnancial performance of Spanish tourism businesses: family vs non-family businesses – a comparative analysis.a
FB NFB t Studentb
Gross proﬁt per service unit 3.86 4.03 1<2*
Economic return 3.85 4.03 1<2*
Financial return after tax 3.77 3.96 1<2*
Return on sales (proﬁt before interest and tax/turnover) 3.88 4.06 1<2*
Source: Own compilation based on information provided by the business itself (questionnaire).
a Evaluation of average performance of the business in the last three years compared to the average for its competitors, considering a 1–7 strength scale, where 1 is much
worse and 7 much better and depending on the perception and information the person surveyed has available.
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usiness as a whole, ﬁnancial return evaluates how it is translated
nto proﬁts for shareholders.
conomic return
Economic return (ER) is that generated by the business using
ts ﬁnancial resources on productive assets, regardless of its ﬁnan-
ial structure. Economic return comes from a quotient between the
roﬁt generated by the business and the investment committed to
t. Broken down it can be expressed as follows:
R = EBIT
TA
= Sales(S)
TA
× EBIT
Sales(S)
The ﬁrst conclusion (Table 4) is that, during the ﬁrst decade
f this century (with a few interruptions) signiﬁcant differences
ppear in economic return between FB and NFB, destroying the
olid advantage that FB seemed to have at the end of the nineties.
n any case, the trend of this indicator is generally downward and
ith ﬂuctuations; this points to a deterioration in the capacity of
oth groups to transform resources proﬁtably. Although the eco-
omic cycle has had much greater effects on the FB group, leaving
ts economic return at 1.5%, while NFB exceed this by more than
alf (2.3%), both are small percentages that are below the risk-free
ate for Europe.
The comparison of the economic results of FB and NFB results
ot only gives information about the value of the economic return
ut also the origin of the differences and whether they lie in dis-
imilarities in margin or rotation. In expressing the calculation of
conomic return, the ﬁrst factor of the product is sales rotation
nd the second return on sales. Economic return is therefore deter-
ined by two indirect effects: the rotation effect r and the margin
ffect m. Asset rotation is a measure of the productivity of capi-
al – effectiveness in the use of assets determining the revenues
btained for each monetary unit of investment. Margin is a val-
ation of organisational and technological efﬁciency determining
osts and, consequently, return on sales: the proﬁt achieved per
onetary unit sold.oups – FB and NFB – based on the Student t.
The analytical breakdown of the components of economic
return, for which precise information is provided in Table 4, sheds
more light on the causes of these differences. This judgement can-
not be homogenised for the whole period studied, because the
records showanunequal development of these componentswithin
the FB group during this time. In the ﬁrst year of the cycle, the FB
generated amargin on sales signiﬁcantly greater than theNFB (14.6
points difference),which, combinedwith an asset turnover 6points
lower, is translated into a notably higher economic return (10.24%
compared to0.78%). This situationchanges for the rest of thedecade
under study. The FB maintained their advantage on margin, with
ups and downs, although the distance was notably reduced due to
their falling margin, as it did not exceed 7.4% again, ending at 2.6%
in 2008. However, this greater margin is not now translated into
better economic return because the asset rotation for NFB becomes
quite high (with the distance ranging between 10 and 26 points),
more than compensating for the disadvantage inmargin. The inter-
nationalisation ofmore activities leads to a growth of investment in
ﬁxed assets, the denominator of the rotation ratio, which explains
the lower productivity of the FB’s capital. It must also be noted that
in 2008 the margin on sales for FB remains below that for NFB,
a scenario not seen since the beginning of the century reﬂecting
the considerable punishment inﬂicted by the change in economic
situation on the ﬁrst group’s proﬁt and loss accounts.
The importance of the differences in margin and rotation is also
explained in Table 4,where theﬁgure achieved for economic return
for FB is expressed with the same asset rotation as for NFB, preser-
ving the advantage inmargin (difference explainedby r), alongwith
the difference between the economic return of FB and that of NFB
if the former had the margin of the latter and the rotation level was
maintained (difference explained by m). We can see that, instead,
FB’s lower economic return obeys the difference in productivity
of capital; even in the years (1998 and 2004) when FB’s economic
return is greater, this is due exclusively to the margin and capital
rotation partially cutting this advantage.
Economic return is affected by the capital intensity required
by the business (Cuervo, 1993, p. 366). Businesses requiring great
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Table 4
Development of economic return (%) in family and non-family tourism businesses (1998–2008).
1998 2001 2004 2007 2008
FB NFB FB NFB FB NFB FB NFB FB NFB
Economic return 10.24 0.78 4.95 8.31 3.28 1.21 2.91 3.95 1.53 2.32
Margin on sales 15.66 1.08 7.40 9.54 5.39 1.71 4.95 4.65 2.60 3.12
Net asset rotation 65.43 71.56 66.82 87.10 60.84 70.83 58.76 84.95 58.95 74.46
Differences
Economic return 9.47a,b −3.36a,b 2.07a −1.04a −0.79a
Margin on sales 14.57a −2.13a 3.68a,b 0.30 −0.52
Asset rotation −6.13 −20.28a −9.99 −26.20a,b −15.52a,b
Differ. explained by r −0.07 −1.94 −0.17 −1.22 −0.48
Differ. explained by m 10.43 −1.86 2.61 0.26 −0.38
Interactive effect −0.89 0.44 −0.37 −0.08 0.07
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nvestment taking a long time to mature (normally classed as
apital-intensive activities) generally show low rotation and big
argins. Because of this, their strategy usually focuses on margin.
utomation slows the rotation speed of the available capital. As
echnical progress increases the productivity of work by replacing
abour with capital, the need for capital expands, with two conse-
uent effects: an increase in ﬁxed costs damaging elasticity in the
ost structure and higher growth in the overall value of the bal-
nce sheet in the expansion capacity of sales. On the other hand,
usinesses positioned in non-capital-intensive activities – strongly
ompetitive and with low margins – usually focus their strategy on
otation. The nature of the competitive strategy is equally reﬂected
n the economic return curve in the sense that businesses with cost
eadership strategies show low margin and high rotation, while
usinesses with differentiation strategies maintain themselves by
ncreasing margin and improving their return (Cuervo, 1993, p.
66).
Therefore, this analysis of the determinants of economic return
uggests that the FB in the Spanish tourism sector are more ori-
ntated towards differentiation strategies and the NFB towards
inimum cost strategies. However, the average FB in the tourism
ector does not appear to be close to any of these models because
f its lack of relief in the two aspects. The sustainability of a differ-
ntiation strategy in FB is questionable due to their low margin on
ales, which also shows a downward trend. The low return on sales
hows that tourismFBhave littlemarketpoweranddonot translate
heir desire for differentiation into imposing high prices on their
ustomers. Nor does the productivity of FB’s capital induce much
ptimism. Spanish tourism FB currently have an average invest-
ent of almost double their turnover. By contrast, NFB appear
etter positioned to exploit cost advantages with high rotation,
lthough they also surpass FB for year-on-year average margin, so
heir differential potential cannot be ignored.
Figs. 1 and2make it possible to analyse thehomogeneity of both
roups around the average value of the factors driving economic
eturn based on the dispersion limits that include 50% and 80% of
usinesses.
Concerning FB, Fig. 1 indicates that the worsening of margin has
een accompanied by a signiﬁcant reduction in dispersion and the
owering of its limits. While in 2001 50% of FB had an economic
eturn ranging between 0.48% and 12.03% (a difference of 12.51
oints), in 2008 the range narrowed to 9 points (ranging between
1.88%and7.13%); for 80%, the contraction is lessnotable (4points)
ndoccurs due to the reduction inbusinesseswithhigher economic
eturn. Rotation underwent fewer changes in its dispersion, with a
onsistent slight reduction in the index.
NFB show more varied behaviour (Fig. 2). The dispersion lim-
ts at 50% have narrowed from a distance of 15.6 points in 2001(0.5–15.1%) to 7.1 points in 2008, with the contraction greater due
to the upper limit falling from 15.1% to 6.1%. If we focus on the 80%
limits, the narrowing is even stronger (26 points), although in this
case the variation is reduced at both extremes. Concerning rotation,
as with the FB, the lower reduction has also meant that less disper-
sion is lost. While 80% of NFB lay in a band of 8.5 points in 2001
(0.23/8.30), in 2008 the rangewas reduced to 6.5 points (0.17/6.35),
particularly because of the fall in cases with high rotation. At the
moment, an approximate practical rule for Spanish tourism busi-
nesseswishing tohavea reasonablyproﬁtableposition in the sector
would consist of achieving amargin on sales of 3.5–10.4% combined
with an asset rotation between 1.9 and 3.3. These limits have been
ﬁxed based on the central values of the dispersion bands at 50% and
80% of both components.
Although the variation band for margins on sales and asset
rotation has narrowed, it is wide enough to show heterogeneous
strategic behaviour between FB and NFB, although the thrust dur-
ing the period under study has been towards greater homogeneity.
In fact, ifwe lookat thedispersionof economic return (Figs. 3 and4),
we see that the range of variation has hardly changed: 50% of FB
lie between zero and 9.85%, a band narrowing slightly from −1.1%
to 6% in 2008; as for NFB, half the group has remained in a band
of 11–12 points (between −1% and 11%). If we look at the disper-
sion of 80% of the family and non-family offer, the band is wider, as
might be expected, andhas narrowed slightly (from24 to 20points,
approximately).
Although only slight, the contracting trend in the dispersion
range, accompanied by the reduction in its maximum and mini-
mum limits, is a sign of the worsening of economic return during
the period analysed. The fact that the percentage of businesseswith
negative economic return has risen from 24.8% to 31.2% in FB and
18.8% to 33.3% in NFB between 2001 and 2008, strongly increasing
in the last ﬁnancial year after a decade of reduction, points to the
same conclusion. The difference in the relative size of this group of
ﬁrmswith such low operating efﬁciency between FB andNFB is not
relevant (Fig. 5).
We can say, then, that a return on total assets above 10.8% is
excellent for FB, while NFB should aspire to exceed 16.2%. At a
more modest level, the minimum acceptable level of achievement
in this dimension of performance for each of these two groups
should move above 3.6% in FB and 5.6% in NFB. These limits have
been ﬁxed based on the central values of the dispersion band
at 50%.Financial return
The ﬁnancial or own funds return (FR) is obtained as the quo-
tient between the ordinary proﬁt or loss after tax and own funds.
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inancial return, then, relates the return the business obtains to
ts ﬁnancial structure, a measure which, like economic return, is
ranslated into proﬁts for shareholders.
As there is a positive relationship between ﬁnancial return and
hare price, whichmakes it possible to consider this (maximisation
f the market value of shares) as the ﬁrst indicator of the business’s
bjective, changes in it should be watched carefully.
Financial return is inﬂuenced by the business’s level of leverage
L), which is measured by the quotient between borrowed funds
ith cost (BF) and own funds (OF).
The pre-tax ﬁnancial return for a business whose own funds
mount to a sum OF, with borrowed funds (BF), whose average
ost is i, and assuming an economic rate of return on assets of ER
ould be:
R = ER × (OF + BF) − (BF × i)
OF
= ER + (ER − i) × BF
OF
= ER + (ER − i) × L
The leverage effect has two components: the leverage margin
nd the leverage factor. The leverage margin depends on value and
he sign of the brackets (RE−i). The leverage factor is the product of
he leveragemargin and the debt level and determineswhether the
ffect of the leverage margin on FR is strengthened or attenuated
y multiplying it by the debt level.
The ﬁnal shareholder return is limited by the ﬁscal effect, as it is
educed by the tax burden affecting the ﬁnal proﬁt for the ﬁnancial
ear (k). So, ﬁnancial return after tax would be:001–2008: dispersion of impulse factors.
FR = ER × (OF + BF) − (BF × i)
OF
× (1 − k)
=
{
ER + (ER − i) × BF
OF
}
× (1 − k) =
{
ER + (ER − i) × L
}
× (1 − k)
Table 5 shows the values of the variables determining the ﬁnan-
cial return and the differences between FB and NFB. Although both
groups have suffered periods when they have been incapable of
making a proﬁt on investment ﬁnanced by debt, NFB have man-
aged tomaintain a positive ﬁnancial return during the period under
study except for the very beginning, while the FB have suffered the
reverse process and their performance has worsened towards the
end of the period, with negative ﬁnancial return after tax of 1.5%
compared toapositive1.03% forNFB.However, incapabilityofmak-
ing proﬁts on investment ﬁnancedwith debt also negatively affects
return on own funds, which has led to this problem persisting for
FB over the last two years.
Financial return for family or non-family Spanish tourism busi-
nesses has deteriorated still more notably than economic return.
Three components have contributed to this unfavourable develop-
ment. The ﬁrst negative factor has been the fall in economic return
itself. It has not been possible to compensate for the fall in this
index with an appreciable reduction in the cost of debt. This has
generated a constant reduction in the return achieved on ﬁnancial
investment with debt (above all in FB), making this negative. The
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Fig. 2. Economic return for non-family businesses 2001–2008: dispersion of impulse factors.
Source: Own compilation based on SABI and INFORMA data.
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hird negative factor alludes to the dynamic of the ﬁnancial lever-
ge effect. In situations where the business manages achieving a
reater return on its assets than the cost of its debt, it is positive
o increase this leverage, because positive values increase ﬁnancial
eturn. But, in contexts like the one typifying Spanish tourism, busi-
esseswith a narrowing gap between economic return and the costFig. 4. Dispersion of economic return for non-family businesses 2001–2008.
Source: Own compilation based on SABI and INFORMA data.of debt, ﬁnally becoming negative, the multiplier effect is achieved
by reducing the debt index in order to achieve a ﬁnancial leverage
effect of less than one. This appears to have been understood by
NFB in 2008, while FB continued along the same lines.
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Fig. 5. Percentage of businesses with positive and negative economic return (1998–2008): comparison between family and non-family businesses.
Source: Own compilation based on SABI and INFORMA data.
Table 5
Development of ﬁnancial return (%) in family and non-family tourism businesses (1998–2008).
1998 2001 2004 2007 2008
FB NFB FB NFB FB NFB FB NFB FB NFB
Economic return (ER) 10.24 0.78 4.95 8.31 3.28 1.21 2.91 3.95 1.53 2.32
Interest rate (i) 6.98 6.21 3.52 3.57 2.56 2.24 3.74 2.96 4.57 3.67
ER – i 3.26 −5.44 1.43 4.74 0.72 −1.03 −0.83 0.98 −3.03 −1.35
Debt level L 146.97 134.79 107.12 55.33 106.71 101.24 122.66 121.01 109.51 80.86
Average effective tax 24.80 9.90 22.37 9.09 31.80 45.53 25.13 14.16 16.38 16.40
Pre-tax ﬁnancial return 15.03 −6.55 6.48 10.93 4.05 0.17 1.88 5.14 −1.79 1.23
Financial return after tax 11.30 −5.90 5.03 9.94 2.76 0.09 1.41 4.41 −1.50 1.03
Differences
Economic return (ER) 9.47a,b −3.36a,b 2.07* −1.04* −0.79*
Interest rate (i) 0.77* −0.05 0.32* 0.78a,b 0.90*
ER – i 8.70a,b −3.31* 1.75* −1.82* −1.68*
Debt level L 12.18b 51.78a,b 5.47 1.64 28.65*
Average effective tax 14.90* 13.28* −13.72a,b 10.97* −0.02
Pre-tax ﬁnancial return 21.58a,b −4.45* 3.88* −3.26a,b −3.02a,b
Financial return after tax 17.20a,b −4.91* 2.67* −3.00a,b −2.53*
Source: Own compilation based on SABI and INFORMA data.
p≤0.05.
a t Student.
b U Mann–Whitney.
Economic return (ER) =EBIT/total net assets.
Interest rate (i) = Financial costs/total debt with cost.
Debt level (L) = total debt with cost/own funds.
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re-taxﬁnancial return=ER− (ER− i)× L.
re-taxﬁnancial return= {(ER− i)× L}× (1− k).
Comparing FB with NFB, the ﬁgures indicate that the net return
chieved by the owners of FBwith investment ﬁnancedwith debt is
otably lower than that reported for NFB (except for the initial sit-
ation and a slight turning point half way through the period). This
isadvantagemust be largely attributed to the economic return dif-
erential in favour of NFB, because the cost of debt does not show
great difference between the two. This negative effect is intensi-
ed by the greater level of debt among FB, which punishes pre-tax
nancial return; andby effective average taxationwhich, in general
erms, is also greater, further expanding the differential in return
n own funds after tax.
Figs. 6 and 7 illustrate the variation in ﬁnancial return between
001 and 2008. In them, a narrowing of the band grouping 50%
f the businesses can be seen. The explanation of this, attenuating
he dispersion shown in economic return, lies in the greater homo-
eneity of the sample concerning the cost of debt and the ﬁnancial
everage effect.
A reduction of the group in the positive band can also be seen
Fig. 8). The percentage of FB with positive ﬁnancial return has
hrunk, from81.6% to 68.8%. AmongNFB, the quota of ﬁrms capable
f achieving a return on own funds is signiﬁcantly greater, although
t has fallen from 83.3% to 68.7%. This percentage of businesses
apable of achieving a return on own funds, which was greater
han those with positive economic return, has ended up at the
ame level due to the punishment resulting fromnegative ﬁnancial
everage.Determinants of the development of return on capital and
productivity
The isolated analysis of economic returnbasedon its twodriving
factors (margin and rotation) and productivity is not enough to dis-
cover the most deep-seated reasons for the changes in return and
productivity on capital. Both factors are more deeply explained by
a series of rotation and cost ratios based on more speciﬁc elements
from the balance sheet and proﬁt and loss account. Knowledge
of these subsidiary ratios is important, so that management can
identify sources for improving the effectiveness of the business,
setting targets for each ratio, delegating responsibilities for achiev-
ing them and controlling the behaviour of the different functional
areas under their supervision. In addition, basedon simulationwith
alternative quantiﬁcation for each area, it allows the calculation of
the effect of the variation in any of the known ratios on the overall
result, so the most effective decisions can be made.
The most usual system for identifying and quantifying this set
of operating factors is the pyramid structure for analysing return
on capital, whether this is the Du Pont version with absolute ﬁg-
ures or the ratio version ﬁrst offered by Ingham and Harrington.
Figs. 9 and 10 include the application of this analysis to the FB and
NFB from the Spanish tourism sector.
The right-hand part of these diagrams identiﬁes four main cost
elementswhich together formtotal operatingcosts:materials (pur-
chasing), staff, ﬁnancial costs and depreciation. Each cost element
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Fig. 6. Financial return of family businesses: driving factors.
Source: Own compilation based on SABI and INFORMA data.
Fig. 7. Financial return of non-family businesses: driving factors.
Source: Own compilation based on SABI and INFORMA data.
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Fig. 8. Percentage of businesses with negative ﬁnancial return (1998–2008): comparison between family and non-family businesses.
Source: Own compilation based on SABI and INFORMA data.
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Fig. 9. Pyramid analysis of the return on capital structure of Spanish family tourism businesses: components, determinants and development 2003–2008.
Source: Own compilation based on SABI and INFORMA data.
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s expressed as a percentage of sales. In FB, the total of the differ-
nt cost items is 92.6% in 2003 and 97.4% in 2008, leaving margins
n sales of 7.4% and 2.6% respectively. In the case of NFB, in the
wo years of reduction, the costs absorb 90.5% and 96.9%, leaving a
argin on sales of 9.5% and 3.1% respectively.
This fall in return on sales has three sources in FB: an increase
n material costs of 1.4 points, staff costs of 5.0 points and ﬁnan-
ial costs of 1.3 points. The expansion of staff costs is justiﬁed
y the important increase in average annual cost per employee,
hich, between 2004 and 2008 increased by 8.6 points, moving
rom 17.8 to 26.4 thousands euros per worker. This increase in
abour costs has not been compensated by an equivalent increase
n labour productivity, which, in the period analysed, increased by
nly 4.75 points, remaining at 35.16 thousands euros per worker.
his resulted in an increase in labour unit costs from 0.68 to 0.75.
he increase in rawmaterial costs has been lower, at 1.4 points, but
t shows up a lack of progress in the improvement of the organisa-
ion and service provision. The third item contributing to increasedurism businesses: components, determinants and development 2003–2008.
costs is ﬁnancial costs, driven up by the 2.4-point increase in ﬁnan-
cial leverage; a1.1-point increase in the average cost of debt and the
reduction in the rotation rate of working capital, together with the
increase in working capital to be ﬁnanced. The reduction in remu-
nerated liabilities in favour of debt without explicit cost is unable
to compensate for these. The only cost item halting the relative
expansion is provision for depreciation, falling by 1.5 points from
9.2% to 7.7%.
The picture for NFB shows some signiﬁcant differences explain-
ing their greater return on sales, although it also undergoes a
notable reduction. The ﬁrst difference takes the form of the rela-
tive development of material costs, falling by 8.6 points to 38.5%
of sales. It is interesting to highlight the fact that the cost for con-
sumption of raw materials by NFB continues to be greater than
that for FB by 8.4 points, but the trend of both groups is completely
different and, as a result of this, the distance has reduced by 10
points in barely 5years. This ﬁgure shows the improvement in tech-
nological efﬁciency and the organisation of working processes at
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FB determining cost levels. This reduction originates in the tech-
ological renewal of the means of production, making it possible
o achieve a saving in the labour factor and reduce material con-
umption based on better ways of working, cutting waste, defects
nd by-products. NFB have also suffered an increase in the other
ost items included in Fig. 10, but their ﬁnal efﬁciency continues
o be greater. Staff costs have grown by a similar amount as at FB
5.7 points), but their share in sales is 4.8 points lower (30.1%),
eﬂecting the slowdown in theexpansionof theaverageannual cost
er employee (less than 2 points). In the same way, ﬁnancial costs
row by 1.9 points, but the amount relative to sales (3.4%) remains
elow FB.
The pyramid analysis developed in these diagrams shows that
otation in FB has fallen by 0.079 points to 0.59, signiﬁcantly below
he ﬁgure for NFB, which maintain a rate of 0.75 (after a fall of
.126 points). The analysis of sales rotation points to the essen-
ial origin of the worsening of efﬁciency in production costs. The
eft-hand part of Figs. 9 and 10 locates four factors determin-
ng asset rotation: ﬁxed assets, ﬁnancial accounts, receivables and
tocks.
A comparison of the development of these items between FB
nd NFB points to the same focuses, but with some differences.
orking capital rotation has fallen by 0.54 points at FB during the
eriod 2003–2008, leaving a ratio of 2.19. This rotation continues
o be less than for NFB (2.23), although this group suffered a con-
iderable reduction of 1.14 points,whichmust largely be attributed
o the increase in the relative weight of stocks in assets (increasing
rom12.56% to15.04%,while in FB it has remained at around10.5%).
espite this reduction in efﬁciency, NFB have maintained a clear
dvantage in management of working capital, above all through
reserving very high stock rotation 57.48 times compared to just
5.53 at FB and more competent purchasing management trans-
ated into a sales/receivables ratio of 2.31 compared to 1.31 for FB.
he overall effect, added to the improvement in management of
ayment collection from customers (for which NFB have an aver-
geperiodof 69days compared to144 for FB)must alsohavehelped
o halt the increase in ﬁnancial costs for NFB, reducing the locking
p of resources to be ﬁnanced. In fact, the need for ﬁnance for the
evolving fund continues to be approximately 5 points lower than
or FB.
To the advantage in working capital rotation, NFB add another
ositive differential in capital productivity. Although in the sam-
le analysed, ﬁxed asset rotation at NFB has fallen by 0.06 points
o 1.12, it continues clearly above FB (0.81), where the ﬁgure has
allen even more due to the combined effect of the slowdown in
ales and the growth of ﬁxed asset investment. The consequences
f the lower rotation of ﬁxed assets in FB are unused capacities,
ow turnover for their capacities and the uncontrolled growth of
nit costs. This problem is reﬂected in the arrangement of all the
roduction factors. So, while staff costs over sales at FB are almost
5%, in NFB they remain at 30%. In other words, even when labour
osts in nominal terms are lower in FB (wages costs per worker
re 26.37 thousand euros compared to 28.18 at NFB), the cost of
taff incorporated in the production process is higher due to their
nderuse, which swells unit costs.
onclusions
This study analyses the development of comparative return on
apital between FB and NFB in the Spanish tourism sector over the
eriod1998–2009.During this periodof time, the Spanish economy
as moved from a recovery phase at the beginning (after undergo-
ng a deep crisis in activity in the preceding years) to the ﬁnal stage
f an expansion cycle and the beginning of a new depression cycle
ith the large-scale destruction of jobs and the business fabric.t and Business Economics 25 (2016) 91–110
Comparing averages, the central years saw considerable sustained
growth.
Speciﬁcally, this study focuses on competitiveness analysis
shown through return on capital. Whether we measure return on
capital by economic return or ﬁnancial return, Spanish tourism
companies lack the capacity to achieve economic margin from
investments or resources committed. Incapability to generate
income shown in the level and development of the usual ratios
measuring the organisational economic performance reveal an
inferior competitive position. The below-normal economic return
and frequency of negative ﬁnancial returns appear to be endemic
problems for Spanish tourism businesses (Becerra, 1998).
Signiﬁcant differences are also detected in the comparison of
results between FB and NFB in the different indicators. The lon-
gitudinal analysis seems to show a changing situation in which,
at the beginning of the period studied, FB enjoyed higher capi-
tal return, while, at the end, the advantage is inverted and NFB
enjoy signiﬁcantly better economic-ﬁnancial performance. In other
words, although the declining trend of these indicators points to a
deterioration of the capacity to proﬁtably transform resources, the
problem ismore accentuated in the FB and, on top of this, they have
also felt much less effect from the change in macroeconomic cycle.
Economic return is a measurement of effectiveness in the
use of assets, depending on sales rotation and organisational-
technological efﬁciency determining costs and, consequently,
return on sales. The behaviour of the population under study has
been unequal during the period studied. The underlying trend is
that FB have generally tended to adopt a differentiation strategy
focused on margin, with low sales rotation, typical of businesses
with high capital intensity and consequently contradicting the
nature of the majority of tourism businesses. The greater capital
productivity of NFB is consistent with the propensity of FB towards
vertical integration and centralisation (Lindow et al., 2010). The
dynamic of return on total assets at FB has been driven by return
on sales, although the advantage in this margin was diluted during
the previous decade to the point of disappearing in 2008, suggest-
ing that their market power to translate differentiation into higher
prices is low. This contradiction is not surprising considering the
typical portrait of FB, revealing the persistence of important com-
petitive disadvantages in key intangible assets for differentiation
(Casillas,Moreno,&Barbero, 2011; Cooper, Upton,& Seaman, 2005;
Kontinen & Ojala, 2010; Miller, McLeod, & Oh, 2001; Westhead,
1997), related to the lack of intellectual capital, knowledge (Block
et al., 2011; Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Lester, 2011) and innova-
tion (Block, 2012; Chin, Chen, Kleinman, & Lee, 2009; Chrisman &
Patel, 2012), and lower searchbreadth (Classen,VanGils, Bammens,
& Carree, 2012). As pointed out by Comi and Eppler (2014), fam-
ily businesses lose their competitiveness as family managers are
averse to taking entrepreneurial risks, over-exploiting existing
competences and preventing the ﬁrm developing dynamic capa-
bilities.
In addition, during thedecadeFBhavenot improved their capac-
ity to increase effectiveness in the use of assets. By contrast, NFB
have been inclined towards low-cost, low-price strategies focusing
on rotation, combined with an improvement in return on sales.
As a result of the differentials in competitiveness explained, the
economic results of FB and NFB show substantial discrepancies,
breaking with the evidence reported in other studies that did not
ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences between them (Chrisman et al., 2004;
Galve& Salas, 2003;Miller et al., 2007;Westhead&Howorth, 2006)
or pointing to superior performance by FB (Allouche et al., 2008;
Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Block et al., 2011; Chu, 2009; Lindow
et al., 2010;Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005;Miralles-Marcelo et al.,
2014; Wagner et al., 2015).
The deterioration in economic return for Spanish tourism busi-
nesses has led, together with the increase in the cost of debt and
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he debt index, to a more than proportional reduction in ﬁnancial
eturn. The return on own funds continues to be very low, far from
heaverage for all non-ﬁnancial businesses andaggregated services
ndhas often been in the redduring theperiodunder study. Thenet
eturn obtained by the owners of FBwith ﬁnancial investmentwith
ebt is notably less than that reported for NFB (except for the ini-
ial situation and a slight turning point in the middle of the period)
oving into negative values in 2008. In the case of FB, this devel-
pment is explained from 2007, not so much because of the cost of
ebt, which is not signiﬁcantly different between the groups, but
ue to the persistence of negative ﬁnancial leverage as a result of
heir incapability to achieve a return greater than the cost of debt
espite the maintenance of a low interest rate scenario. The neg-
tive effects of this leverage have been intensiﬁed by the greater
ebt level of FB.
FB have the tough challenge of managing to create more wealth
or their owners with methods that allow them to grow without
osing their family identity andwithout aggravating the problemof
nancial solvency they already have. The strengthening of the now
carce capacity to generate funds through self-ﬁnancing through
he improvement of economic return is reafﬁrmed as a key factor in
he economic-ﬁnancial balance of this group. Achieving this means
cting on the exante competitiveness factors which are the levers
oving the business’s results.
These conclusions must be considered bearing in mind the lim-
tations of the work. In fact, the validity of the results obtained in
his study depends on a series of issues related to the design of
ur research. Speciﬁcally, our measurements are based on a broad
eﬁnition of FB extensively used in previous studies (e.g. Dibrell &
oeller, 2011; Gallo et al., 2004; Neubaum et al., 2012) and even
he tourism sector itself (Getz & Carlsen, 2000). However, it would
e interesting to expand this design by analysing whether there
re differences between the proﬁtability of FB depending on their
lassiﬁcation into different types referring to speciﬁc characteris-
ics of the ownership and control structure and their management
nd corporate governance, following the line of research noted by
tudies like thosebyMazzi (2011) andO’Boyle Jr et al. (2012). In line
ith these authors, it would also be interesting to introduce new
oderating variables into the model relating to the size and char-
cteristics of the FB, such as generation, shareholding complexity
nd management discretion. The replication of this study in other
ountries and sectors would allow control over the generalisation
f the results obtained in other institutional contexts (Miller et al.,
007; Sacristán-Navarro et al., 2011). Finally, this study makes it
ossible to lay the basis for investigating the resources and capac-
ties on which the competitive advantage of NFB over FB is based
nd, ultimately, their economic-ﬁnancial results.
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